Abstract: Alfred Cowles ' (1934) test of the Dow Theory apparently provided strong evidence against the ability of the ability of Wall Street's mos t famous chartist to forecast the stock market. In this paper, we review Cowles' evidence and find that it supports the contrary conclusion -that the Dow Theory, as applied by its major practitioner, William Peter Hamilton over the period 1902 to 1929, yielded positive risk-adjusted returns. A re-analysis of the Hamilton editorials suggests that timin g strategies based upon the Dow Theory yield high Sharpe ratios and positive alphas.
Goetzmann, The Dow Theory 1 Alfred Cowles ' (1934) test of the Dow Theory apparently provided strong evidenc e against the ability of Wall Street's most famous chartist to forecast the stock market. Cowles' analysis was a landmark in the development of empirical evidence about the informationa l efficiency of the market. He claimed that market timing based upon the Dow Theory resulted in returns that lagged the market. In this paper, we review Cowles' evidence and find that it in fact supports the contrary conclusion -that the Dow Theory, as applied by its majo r practitioner, William Peter Hamilton over the period 1902 to 1929, yielded positive risk-adjusted returns. The difference in the results is due to the lack of adjustment for risk. Cowles compared the returns obtained from Hamilton's market timing strategy to a benchmark of a fully invested stock portfolio. In fact, the Hamilton portfolio, as Cowles interpreted it, was frequently out of the market. Adjustment for systematic risk appears to vindicate Hamilton as a market timer.
In order to estimate the risk-adjusted returns that may have been obtained by following the Dow Theory over the Hamilton period, we classify the market forecasts he made over 255 editorials published in the Wall Street Journal during his tenure as editor. Using the riskless rate as a benchmark, we find that Hamilton's ratio of correct to incorrect calls was higher than would be expected by chance. Using total retur n data for the Cowles index of stock market returns and the S&P index over the 27 year period, we find that the systematic risk of a trading strateg y proposed by Cowles based upon the Wall Street Journal editorials was relatively low. We apply market timing measures used to identify skill to the time-series of returns to the Hamilto n strategy, and we find significant positive evidence. An event-study analysi s of the Dow Industrial Index around Hamilton's editorials indicates a significant difference in mean returns over a 40 day period following "Bull" vs. "Bear" market calls. The even t study also shows that Hamilton's Goetzmann, The Dow Theory 2 forecasts were based upon a momentum strategy.
Our finding suggest a plain reason why the Dow Theory remains to this day a popula r method for timing the market. During the f irst three decades of this century it appeared to work.
Regardless of whether it has worked since then , this early success established a reputation which has endured for decades. This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides historical background on the Dow Theory and William Peter Hamilton. Section III de scribes the empirical test of the Dow Theory published by Alfred Cowles in 1934, and discusses it's interpretation in light of current methods of risk adjustment. Section V describes our re-analysis of the Hamilton editorials and section VI concludes.
William Peter Hamilton and the Dow Theory
Most of what we know of the Dow Theory of stock market movements comes not from the founding editor of The Wall Street Journal, Charles Henry Dow, but from his successor , William Peter Hamilton, who assumed the editorship of the paper upon Dow's death in 1902.
Over the next 27 years until his own death in late 1929, Hamilton wrote a series of editorials in
The Wall Street Journal and in Barron's, discussing and forecasting major trends in the U.S . stock. Hamilton cited his predecessor Charles Dow's theory of stock market movements as the explicit basis for market predictions. In his 1922 book The Stock Market Barometer, Hamilton further elucidates the basic outlines of the theory. The theory pre-supposes that the marke t moves in persistent "Bull" and "Bear" trends. While determination of these trends is hampered by short-term deviations, Hamilton asserts that "charting" past fluctuations in the industrial and Goetzmann, The Dow Theory 3 transportation indices allows the analyst to identify the primary market movement.
An acute irony, given the current reputation Dow theorists enjoy among financia l economists, is that Hamilton's book succinctly articulates and defends the concept we now term informational efficiency of the stock market. According to Hamilton, "The market movement reflects all the real knowledge available..." This assertion is interp reted by a later prominent Dow theorist, Robert Rhea, in 1932 , to mean that:
The Averages Discount Everything: -The fluctuations of the daily closing prices of the Dow-Jones rail and industrial averages afford a composite index of all the hopes, disappointments, an d knowledge of everyone who knows anything of financial matters, and for that reason the effects of coming events (excluding acts of God) are always properly anticipated in their movement. Th e average quickly appraise such calamities as fires and earthquakes. 1 How, then, could the theory be consistent with the notion that past market trends are predictive of future price movements? According to Hamilton, "...the pragmatic basis for the theory, a working hypothesis, if nothing more, lies in human nature itself. Prosperity will drive men to excess, and repentance for the consequence of those excesses will produce a correspondin g depression." In other words, the bull and bea r market cycles envisioned by the Dow Theory are due to "the irrational exuberance" of individual investors, which its elf appears not to be rationally incorporated into prices.
While the basic outlines of the Dow Theory may be gleaned from presage the emergence of a definite trend. In other words, a big move following a period o f quiescence is taken as the beginning of a primary trend in that direction. Despite Cowles' careful work at calculating total returns for the tw o strategies, he neglects to adjust for differences in relative risk. These differences in fact appear to have bee n substantial. According to Cowles, "Hamilton was long of stocks 55 per cent, short 16 per cent, and out of the market 29 per cent, out of the 26 years under review." These numbers suggest that the systematic risk of the strategy was a far cry from 100%. Indeed, using the crud e approximation for the average beta of .55-.16 = .39, it seems t hat the Dow strategy earned a risk- 
Analysis of the Hamilton Editorials
In order to evaluate Hamilton as a market timer, we code the 255 Hamilton editorials as bullish, bearish, neutral or indeterminant. We then collect total return information on the U.S.
stock market information over that period, and perform parametric and non-parametric tests of Goetzmann, The Dow Theory 7 trading strategies analogous to those evaluated by Cowles. Finally we examine the pric e dynamics of the Dow Industrials around editorial publication dates.
Hamilton's Editorials
Unfortunately, the recommendations in the editorials are not always clear. Cowles ' solution is to have five subjects score the editorials and then take the majority opinion on each.
We use only one subject to score the editorials and find eleven in determinant cases out of the 255 which we eliminate from the study. We calculate that th e portfolio is in stocks 46% of the time, in bills 38% of the time and short 16% of the time. These percentages are based upon th e number of months in each asset. When we count the number of bull, bear or neutral calls, the ratios are much closer to Cowles': long 54%, neutral 24% and short 22%. Our scoring therefore appears slightly different from the Cowles analysis, which has the portfolio long mor e frequently. As we show in the following analysis, it is unlikely that the minor differences i n interpretation of the editorials are the basis for the divergence in our results.
Non-Parametric Tests
To address the basic question of Hamilto n's timing skill, we examine how often the Dow beats or lags the riskless rate over the interval following an editorial, conditional upon a bull of bear call. The interval following the editorial is defined by the day following the editorial to the day of the next Hamilton editorial. Our analysis of the frequency of successful calls differ s substantially from Cowles. 
Testing a Trading Strategy
Following Cowles, we simulate a trading strategy which moves from long stocks to short stocks to t-bills, depending upon the Ham ilton editorial. While Cowles apparently used a 50/50 portfolio mixture of the Dow industrials and the Dow r ailroads, we use the Cowles market index: a value-weighted index of U.S. stocks, including income return. This is widely considered to be the highest-quality monthly return series available, and mimics a passive strategy of holdin g stocks. As the alternative investment, we use the short-term rate of 5% used by Cowles in his analysis. We further assume that the portfolio could only be re-balanced monthly, which allows Goetzmann, The Dow Theory 9 us to use the monthly Cowles indices. Accordingly, we take the first recommendation tha t appeared in a month, and then assume that th is is used as a guide to rebalancing at the end of the month. In those months for which we have more than one recommendation, this means that we ignored the later call. As a consequence, we do not pick up intra-month returns to the Do w strategy. The first column of Table 2 reports the results of the simulated investment strategy over the 27 year period. The annual arithmetic return to the Dow portfolio is 9.95% (9.83 % geometric), slightly below the annual average return obtained by holding the Cowles all-stock portfolio, which yields an annual arithmetic average of 10.90% (10.54% geometric). On a riskadjusted basis, however, the Dow portfolio has a higher Sharpe ratio (1.2 compared to 5.25) and a positive Jensen measure of 3.12% -300 basis points per year. This high Jensen measure is due to a beta of .31 with respect to the Cowles index.
Bootstrapping Tests
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The rest of Table 2 reports the results of si gnificance tests generated by bootstrapping the Dow strategy. The bootstrap is performed in two different ways. In the first panel, test statistic distributions are generated by bootstrapp ing in the space of returns. We generating stock return series' by drawing monthly returns with replacem ent from the Cowles total return series over the sample period. Thus, we construct a null hypothesis that Hamilton has no forecasting ability, that the market follows a random walk, and that mean and variance for the market are constant.
We report the mean, median, standard deviation, t-test, 95% (or 5% for standard deviations) .
The final column shows the rank represented by the actual value. The Dow portfolio yields an unusually high annual return compared to the null. The expected return from such a strateg y appears to be around 5%. The actual return of 9.95% ranks above the 99th percentile of th e bootstrap distribution. While the standard deviation of t he strategy is also low, it appears that the full-investment strategy also resulted in an unusually low standard deviation. This appears to 4 provide evidence against the random walk assumption of the bootstrap. The Sharpe measure of the Dow portfolio exceeds all of the bootstrapped values, and the Jensen measure of the Do w portfolio exceeds the 99% level. Neither the mean return nor the Sharpe ratio for the all-stock portfolio are unusual, although the low stand ard deviation puts the Sharpe ratio at the 63% level.
Note that the standard deviation of the Dow Jensen measure is 1.97%. This means we cannot reject the joint hypothesis null that the that Jensen measure is zero and returns follow a random walk.
The second panel in Table II reports the results of a different form of bootstrap. Rather than destroying the time-series structure of stock returns over the period to construct a null, we randomize in the space of strategies, holding the market realization constant. The methodology Goetzmann, The Dow Theory 11 is in fact the procedure pioneered by Cowles himself in another part of his landmark paper. In order to test whether a sample of investment newsletters had forecasting ability, he simulated a null of random stock selection (using a deck of cards!) and then compared the distribution o f actual analyst performance records to those generated under a null that forecasts were simpl y random. Inability to reject this null led Cowles to the conclusion that stock market forecasters could not forecast.
We apply this same procedure to the Hamilton forecasts to generate our null. We draw "Bull", "Bear" and "Neutral" forecasts, with replacement from the actual Hamilton editoria l series. We thus generate 500 simulated track records under a null that the editor was, in effect, flipping coin, properly weighted so as to give the same expected proportions of "Bull" an d
"Bear" forecasts as in the original series. The advanta ge of this is that we do not break the actual time-series characteristics pf the market history itself. Our bootstrap in the space of strategies now conditions upon the true market realization. We do, however, alter the time-serie s characteristics of Hamilton's While they no longer forecast future returns by construction, they also bear no relationship to past returns. They are no longer conditioned upon the time-series behavior of the market.
The result of bootstrapping in the space of strategies yields essentially the same result as bootstrapping in the space of returns. The alpha and Sharpe ratio are in the extreme tails of the bootstrapped distributions. We can clearly reject the null that Hamilton's could have done as well by flipping (an appropriately weighted) coin.
Editorials as Events
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Another measure of Hamilton's skill at market timing is to t reat each editorial as an event,
and examine whether bull market calls are followed by positive market moves and bear market calls are followed by negative market moves. We use event-study methods and daily Do w Industrial Average data to examine the index dynamics around Hamilton's. Figure 2 shows the price path for bull, bear and neutral calls. The paths represent the cumulated sum of the equalweighted average appreciation return of the Dow Industrial Index over the forty trading day s preceding and following the publication of the ed itorial. Bull calls are followed by a 1.5% price increase over the next forty days on average, while bear calls are followed by 1.74% pric e decrease over the next forty days. The difference between these two, as measured by a two-tailed t-test allowing for unequal variance is significant at the 95% lev el (.034 prob.value). The neutral calls have a .21% return over the next 40 days.
The figure also indicates the basis for Hamilton's calls. Bear calls follow steep recen t declines in the Dow, while bull calls follow recent positive trends. This is consistent with a theory of market trends. The result is clearly a momentum strategy, in which steep recen t declines or advances are taken as signals of future trends in that direction. Statistics for the trading strategy are reported in Column 1. The strategy follows Cowles (1934) and assumes a short position in the stock market is taken at th e end of the month in which a down call is made, while a long po sition in the market is taken at the end of the month in which an up call is made. Neutral calls ar e taken as a signal to invest in riskless securities.
Conclusion
Randomizing returns bootstrap results are based upon 500 outcomes under a null in which market returns are i.i.d. Pseudo-histories of total monthly returns for the 27 year period are generated by random draws with replacement from the actual distribution of monthly returns. Randomizing strategies bootstrap results ar e based upon 500 outcomes of a null in which market forecasts are random . Pseudo-strategies are generated by drawing with replacement from the actua l distribution of Hamilton forecasts with replacement. 
